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Abstract. Drawing on non-Darwinian cultural-evolutionary approaches, the paper 
develops a broad, non-representational perspective on narrative, necessary to 
account for the narrative “ubiquity” hypothesis. It considers narrativity as a feature of 
intelligent behaviour and as a formative principle of symbolic representation (“narrative 
proclivity”). Th e narrative representation retains a relationship with the “primary” 
pre-symbolic narrativity of the basic orientational-interpretive (semiotic) behaviour 
aff ected by perceptually salient objects and “fi ts” in natural environments. Th e paper 
distinguishes between implicit narrativity (as the basic form of perceptual-cognitive 
mapping) of intelligent behaviour or non-narrative media, and the “narrative” as a 
symbolic representation. Human perceptual-attentional routines are enhanced by 
symbolic representations: due to its attention-monitoring and information-gathering 
function, narrative serves as a cognitive-exploratory tool facilitating cultural dynamics. 
Th e rise of new media and mass communication on the Web has thrown the ability of 
narrative to shape the public sphere through the ongoing process of negotiated sense-
making and interpretation in a particularly sharp relief. 
Keywords: narrative; cognition; complexity; attention; symbolic representation; cultural 
evolution; development; post-Darwinism
While Darwinist and neo-Darwinist discourses gained popularity in the humanities 
in the 19th century (for instance, in Brunetière’s 1890 work that discussed ‘natural 
selection’ in literary genre systems) and were adopted or contested by many scholars 
in the 20th century, the ongoing revision of the neo-Darwinian models and the 
emergence of non-Darwinian approaches that favour developmental (epigenetic, 
cultural) over evolutionary (genetic) factors remain largely unembraced by the 
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humanities.1 Th e post-Darwinian models of evolution, oft en combining Darwinian 
and non-Darwinian aspects (e.g. Kull 1999; Koonin 2011), suggest the opportunity of 
bridging the biological and sociocultural dynamics, or, rather, seeing biological factors 
as aff ordances liable to cultural enhancement, transformation or suppression, and, on 
the other hand, organisms’ embodied-cognitive (interpretive-orientational, semiotic) 
activity as defi nitive in both biological and cultural dynamics.
Th ese new approaches stress the necessity to account for the interaction of genetic 
and cultural systems, highlight the limitations of neo-Darwinism when applied 
to the study of cultural systems and the ability of cultural systems to assimilate, 
guide and alter evolutionary processes with whom they are dynamically entwined 
(the ‘assimilate-stretch’ principle): “Cultural evolution led to the expansion of the 
environment as it was perceived by humans, and as a result individuals were faced 
with more information than they could learn and communicate” (Jablonka, Lamb 
2014: 304). Complex cultural processes of learning, invention, regeneration, and 
construction are not reducible to random variation, selection and adaptation or 
transmission (heredity), as the neo-Darwinist cultural evolutionists suggest. As 
Jablonka and Lamb (2014: 223–224) observe, “if one’s notion of evolution is based on 
neo-Darwinian thinking – on selection acting on discrete units that are not altered 
during the process of transmission and that are random with respect to the factors 
that aff ect their generation and subsequent chances of spread – then calling historical 
cultural changes ‘evolution’ seems to be a misuse of the term […]. It is ultimately 
the agent – individual and a social group – that constructs and generates ideas and 
practices”. 
In the ongoing discussion on cultural evolution, a signifi cant place is assigned 
to language as a symbolic inheritance and information transmission system. In this 
paper, we discuss the primary role of narrative, another essential part of human 
1 Some theoretical works crossing the boundaries of biosemiotics and cultural studies 
constitute an exception – see e.g. Wendy Wheeler’s  Th e Whole Creature: Complexity, 
Biosemiotics and the Evolution of Culture (2006) and Paul Cobley’s Cultural Implications 
of Biosemiotics (2016). See also Petitot 2004[1985] on the typological connections 
between ‘dynamical structuralism’ in biology, with its focal concept of morphogenesis, 
and other types of structuralism, including linguistic ones. Whereas “the neo-Darwinian 
paradigm obscures the intelligibility of morphological phenomena”, “reduces them to a 
by-product of evolutionary chance” (Petitot 2004: 31) and subordinates principles of an 
organism’s internal organization to the external pressures, structuralist biology stresses 
the importance of self-regulation: the environmental pressures trigger changes (variation, 
adaptation), but the character of these changes depends also on the organism’s structural 
stability and developmental choices. See also Holenstein on parallels between linguistic 
and biological structuralism and the non-Darwinian ideas of nomogenesis and teleonomy 
in Slavic (East- and Central-European) philosophies of nature (Holenstein 1976: 118–
120).
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equipment, originating in the basic orientational-interpretive prelinguistic behaviour 
patterns translated into various media (acoustic, verbal, graphic, bodily), becoming a 
crucial part of human cultural toolkit and, thereby, bridging the natural-evolutionary 
and cultural-developmental dynamics. In our view, non-Darwinian approaches off er 
a more comprehensive view on the genesis and function of narrative in culture.      
Th e discussion will be structured around certain focal points. We presume that 
(1) narrativity is contingent on attending to salient features of the environment and 
basic orientational-interpretive activity; attention, according to Gibson (1979; see 
the discussion below), bolsters functioning and development of perceptual systems 
via permanent scooping and shaping of external information; (2) the capacity of 
monitoring attentional (iconical-indexical) patterns and scooping information from 
the environment – an ontogenetic ‘narrative aff ordance’ – is enhanced by symbolic 
representations, whereas ‘artifi cial’ narratives (i.e. fi ctional narrative representations), 
along with other artefacts, function as attention monitoring devices (see e.g. Carroll and 
Seeley 2013 on movies as ‘attentional engines’)2: from the cognitive point of view, art, 
thereby, proves to be a specifi c perceptual (predicative, pre-conceptual) information-
gathering and knowledge-accretion device (see also Grishakova 2014: 201–202)3 and, 
thereby, an important tool of cultural evolution; (3) due to its knowledge-accretion 
(epistemic) function, narrative serves also as a cognitive-exploratory tool facilitating 
sociocultural dynamics.             
1. Ubiquity of narrative
Is narrativity, indeed, ubiquitous and pervasive, or was its scope and role overstated 
in the recent ‘narrative turn’? If it is ubiquitous and pervasive, what are the causes and 
consequences of its pervasiveness? While acknowledging the prominence of narrative 
in culture, we fi nd it diffi  cult to support essentialist approaches that reduce narrativity 
to a prototypical form or function. Without entering extensive polemics, we shall 
draw further inferences from existent evidence and reasoning on narrative to account 
2 “Movies function as attentional engines intentionally designed to focus perception on those 
aspects of the depictive scaff olding of shots and scenes diagnostic for their narrative content and 
meaning. Th e information structure of the movie will, therefore, perhaps counterintuitively, 
closely match the information structure of real-time experience” (Carroll, Seeley 2013: 59).
3 On the basic perceptual level, information may be defi ned as a sensory input that involves a 
reaction (response). Knowledge is observer-related and implies sense-making, interpretation. 
In a wider sense, information covers both meanings: “for something (a source) to contain 
or carry information there must fi rst be some kind of receiver that reacts to this source and 
interprets it. Th e receiver can be an organism, a cell, or a man-made machine. Th rough its 
reaction and interpretation, the receiver’s functional state is changed in a way that is related to 
the form and organization of the source” (Jablonka, Lamb 2014: 54).
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for the narrative “ubiquity” hypothesis and to reveal its consequences for theorizing 
cultural dynamics. 
Proponents of verbally or textually oriented narratology and advocates of a 
narrow defi nition of narrativity disputed extensions of the concept of narrative to 
other media as a metaphorical projection of verbal features. On the contrary, from the 
logical and functionalist perspective, the existence of “the logical structure, underlying 
the phenomenology of all possible narrative realizations”, as an ideal ‘type’ related 
to various ‘tokens’ (Meister et al. 2005: xiv), sanctions the broad understanding of 
narrativity and endorses its almost universal presence. Likewise, certain trends 
in cognitive psychology, linguistics and narratology relate surface linguistic 
manifestations to the deep-level, subconsciously manipulated mental representations. 
From the cognitive perspective based on the mentalist hypothesis, narrative is part 
of human cognitive equipment, a tool for thinking. For Turner, this mental narrative 
form, the ‘mental instrument’ of parable (Turner 1996: 5–7) is a basic story-generating 
mechanism made manifest by language.  
However, recent critique of computational models of cognition and the rise of non-
mentalist theories (enactivism, process philosophy, embodied cognition) cast doubts 
on the very existence of mental representations and tend to see the origins of symbolic 
representation in a specifi c type of responsive behaviour – human interaction with 
their environments, specifi c biocultural ‘couplings’ that stem from recurrent patterns 
of behaviour (“action coordination routines”, Hutto 2008: 51), and mimetic enaction. 
Th e rise of language is considered contingent on these types of behaviour interlocking 
action, perception and cognition. In these recent approaches, narrative is seen as a 
sociocultural phenomenon or a kind of evolved and more complex type of linguistic 
behaviour. According to Hutto’s narrative practice hypothesis, children are to be 
exposed to “people-focused conversations” and storytelling by their caregivers to get a 
grasp of other people’s beliefs, desires, thoughts, and perceptions. Another philosopher 
of narrative, Gregory Currie, while observing that the idea of the biological basis of 
the evolved preference for narrative information is “not an absurd one” (Currie 2010: 
47), contends, however, that, from his own perspective, the preference for the narrative 
mode of thinking is, rather, sustained by cycles of cultural learning and verbal 
communication: “Th e human capacity for linguistic communication co-evolved with 
a taste for signifi cantly narrativized accounts of people’s behaviour. Th e elaboration of 
language made ever more complex narratives possible, while the growing preference 
for narrative served to dampen the tendency to use language deceptively, by facilitating 
reliable information fl ow concerning deceptive behaviour” (Currie 2010: 47).  
However, the relation between the ‘simple’ and the ‘complex’ does not always prove to 
be unidirectional or progressive. From certain perspectives (for instance, complex-systemic 
approach), the ‘complex’ (as relational) may, on the contrary, precede the emergence of 
the ‘simple’ (as selected, distinct, separated, autonomic). For example, Varela, in his work 
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on ‘specious present’, pointed out that the Husserlian idea of ‘complex time’ (past and 
future inherent in the mobile horizon of the present) has a neural basis (Varela 1999). 
Or, otherwise, one may say that complexity (the multi-directional and multi-level neural 
relations of activation and relaxation) is more ‘natural’ and primary as compared with 
more recent linear or sequential models of time. Another example is linguistic complexity. 
Data on the simplifi cation and complexifi cation of languages testify that language contacts 
between adult speakers pursuing practical aims and involved in language learning most 
oft en result in simplifi cation (for instance, through pidginization), whereas ‘natural’ 
linguistic situation based on co-territorial contacts involving child bilingualism leads to 
complexifi cation (Trudgill 2011: 34). Trudgill relates these regularities to the inability of 
adult speakers to learn language quickly and effi  ciently aft er passing the critical threshold 
for language acquisition: “Post-threshold learners have less diffi  culty in coping with 
regularity and transparency than irregularity and opacity; and loss of redundancy reduces 
the burden for learner speakers. Highly irregular and non-transparent features are harder 
to learn and remember – they are, in Carstairs-McCarthy’s nice phrase, ‘cognitive irritants’” 
(Trudgill 2011: 41). Finally, a recent evolutionary hypothesis of ‘complexity by subtraction’ 
by Daniel McShea and Wim Hordijk also puts the directional aspect of the Darwinian 
theory under question and off ers an alternative explanation to natural complexity (McShea, 
Hordijk 2013; Paul 20134).      
Similarly, it could be argued that the narrative ‘complexity’ as an evolved embodied 
orientational-perceptual and patterning capacity precedes ‘simplicity’ of the discrete 
linguistic forms. Indeed, as Terrence Deacon observes in Th e Symbolic Species, the 
revolutionizing linguistic capacity that radically separates humans from the animal 
world (or, broader, the capacity to use symbolic representations – which include also 
drawings, diagrams, maps and other mixed representations that Deacon, however, fails 
to mention in his discussion of co-evolution of language and the brain) stems from 
the ability to discern and manipulate complex associative iconic-indexical patterns in a 
mass of chaotic signals rather than from the referential object-word (sign) matching 
(Deacon 1997). Arguably, this ability explains the miraculously fast and fl uent learning 
of language by preverbal children – but also the phylogenetic evolution of language. 
Th e discovery (by developmental and cognitive psychology) of similar, more or less 
universal, recognition-expectation-monitoring patterns of behaviour that young 
children demonstrate across cultures warrants Deacon’s hypothesis. Such patterns 
include discrimination between animate and inanimate objects, chunking perceived 
continuous information into more or less discrete ‘blocks’ (events); detecting causal 
and temporal connections between those blocks, seeing some of these events as 
4 Paul, Catie 2013. A non-Darwinian theory of evolution proposed. Th e Johns Hopkins 
News-Letter. April 25, 2013 was accessed at http://www.jhunewsletter.com/2013/04/25/a-non-
darwinian-theory-of-evolution-proposed-22259/ on 2 July 2016.
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intentional actions (and, thus, performed by intentional actors), joint attention 
patterns – see e.g. Currie (2010: xviii): “I suggest that narrative framing occurs by a 
process of guided attention – a notion which generalizes the psychologically crucial 
concept of joint attention; it is linked to powerful mechanisms of imitation. Th is helps 
me to defi ne the standard mode of engagement with narrative”. It is easy to notice that 
these patterns of children’s early behaviour are constitutive of narrativity.
2. The role of attention      
While philosophers were reluctant to overtly acknowledge the perceptual-orien-
tational, pre-linguistic nature of narrativity,5 empirical observation brought develop-
mental and cognitive psychologists (Jeannerod 2006; Trevarthen 1993) to believe that 
narrative structures are contingent on embodied patterns of perception, cognition, and 
action. Due to their universality (that becomes variegated in various socio-cultural 
contexts) and constitutive character as regards narrativity, the ability of detecting and 
monitoring these complex indexical-iconic patterns may be described as a biocultural 
aff ordance or pre-linguistic (pre-symbolic) premise of narrativity. In this connection, it 
should be noted that the implicit narrativity (as the basic form of perceptual-cognitive 
mapping, orientation and perspective-taking) of intelligent behaviour, music or 
plastic arts has to be distinguished from ‘narrative’, i.e. a symbolic representation with 
a specifi c explicit structure (with a beginning and end, peaks or turning points etc., 
depending on an accepted defi nition of narrative). In our view, narrative aff ordances 
are of dual – cultural and biological (rather than solely cultural) origin, resulting from 
the co-evolution of human mind and culture. Th ey (rather than a universal logical 
form or mental representation) account for the pervasiveness of narrative. Th ey stem 
from animal indexical informational sensitivity to salient (recognitional) elements 
in the environments6 and develop into the stabilized, shared attentional patterns in 
5 See, however, Menary 2008 on the “minimal embodied narrative” that “allows for a subject 
of experiences (the minimal, embodied, feeling and perceiving self) and, therefore, anchors 
narratives in the unfolding sequence of embodied and embedded perceptions of an individual” 
(Menary 2008: 76). 
6 Hutto (2008: 51) points to the non-representational character of these basic (biosemiotic) 
forms of cognition: “[...] basic worldly engagements of animals (including ourselves) are not 
content-involving; they do not involve conceiving of, categorizing, classifying, or otherwise 
“representing” that which is the focus of such responding […]. Perceptual sensitivity to 
specifi c natural signs prompt action in a quite immediate way and inherited mechanisms drive 
characteristic responses. Such online informational responsiveness comes in degrees of graded 
complexity”. Th e continuum between the natural “response” and “representation” as a complex 
form of response is captured by the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Th irdness 
(see e.g. Menary 2007). 
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cultural, symbolic communications. Galen Strawson’s (2004) refutation of narrativity 
proves to be futile: narrativity is just there.  
Whereas linguists, discourse psychologists and literary scholars studied narrative 
attention-capturing and -monitoring devices without any relation to evolutionary 
ideas (e.g. research by Emmott 1997, Miall 2006, and others), psychologists and 
anthropologists considered aesthetic form as a specifi c attention-capturing and 
-monitoring device of crucial signifi cance in the process of co-evolution of human 
mind and culture. Merlin Donald defines art as a “specific kind of cognitive 
engineering” based on the reciprocal attention control (Donald 2006: 4). Ellen 
Dissanayake refers to the function of capturing and holding attention, making special, 
i.e. increasingly protected salience of certain objects (artifacts) and their components, 
as the essential factor in the evolution of art (Dissanyake 1992). Brian Boyd’s On the 
Origin of Stories summarizes some ideas developed in evolutionary-psychological and 
cultural studies and extends them to the narrative form: “[...] we can view art as a kind 
of cognitive play, the set of activities designed to engage human attention through their 
appeal to our preference for inferentially rich and therefore patterned information” 
(Boyd 2009: 85). From the neo-Darwinian perspective, attention works as selective 
pressure. Arguably, the attended narrative and aesthetic forms are selected and become 
more prominent and recurrent: “Attention provides the selective mechanism of art. If 
a work of art fails to earn attention, it dies” (Boyd 2009: 121). Th e neo-Darwinian 
approach does not account for the cumulative,7 multi-level and asynchronous 
nature of cultural processes and the ability of symbolic systems to encode latent 
information that may be activated and transformed by complex systemic factors with 
a considerable delay (see e.g. Jablonka, Lamb 2014). In the popular neo-Darwinian 
accounts adopted by literary and cultural studies, an unwarranted shift  and extension 
of perspective occurs: whereas evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists discuss 
the evolutionary-psychological factors prominent in the origins and development of 
art at earlier stages of co-evolution of human species and culture, the projection of the 
neo-Darwinian model onto the fi eld of literary or cultural studies subordinates entire 
cultural dynamics to a few genetic-evolutionary principles. 
Taking into consideration a specifi c character of cultural dynamics and the 
complex overlapping of synchronic-diachronic layers in culture as well as its immanent 
7 “Th e evolution of culture is quite diff erent from biological evolution, the word ‘evolution’ 
may be quite misleading. Biological evolution involves species dying out and natural selection. 
Th e researcher fi nds only living creatures contemporary with him. […] In the history of art, 
however, works which come down to us from remote cultural periods continue to play a part in 
cultural development as living factors. A work of art may ‘die’ and come alive again […]. What 
‘works’ is not the most recent temporal section, but the whole packed history of cultural texts” 
(Lotman 1990: 127). 
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regularities, the neo-Darwinian projection proves to be oversimplifi ed. Indeed, on 
the basic perceptual level, attending is a form of response, i.e. (non-intentional) 
information transmission. Yet cultural dynamics includes a complex interaction of 
attention attractors and ‘frustrators’ of sociocultural origin, not reducible to biological 
needs and factors. Certain attention patterns become stabilized (i.e. through learning 
and cultural competence), others altered or suppressed (e.g. through tabooing). 
Boyd’s book resonates with linguistic, and discourse-psychological studies by relating 
specifi c, attention-capturing patterns in artistic stories to specifi c formal and thematic 
features and strategies that violate or modify the reader’s (recipient’s) expectations 
– “delivering high-intensity social information” (Boyd 2009: 219), plotting obstacles 
whose overcoming increases the prominence of characters, violating chronology, 
rhythm and speed of narration through compression, expansion or altering emphases. 
Indeed, “attention” is a culturally mediated feature of intelligent behaviour. Th e 
culturally and aesthetically prominent or attention-capturing is contingent on cultural 
norms, functions, value judgements, individual intentions, biases and other factors.  
Attention appears to be both an important function of living perceptual systems 
and a cultural tool in James Gibson’s ecological psychology. For Gibson, attention 
is an operating principle of a perceptual system, or, rather, of its fi ve perceptual 
modalities (senses that become associated, organized or fused in the process of 
information pickup), with fi ve respective types of overt attention – the principle that 
makes a perceptual system “orient, explore, investigate, adjust, optimize, resonate, 
extract” (Gibson 2015[1979]: 235). Attention “provides the whole input-output loop” 
between the perceptual system and environment. However, it is also “a skill that can 
be educated”, susceptible to maturation and learning,8 that makes the information 
increasingly more precise, subtle, and elaborate.  
While building on Gibson’s conception, we highlight the self-regulating role of 
attention, as an informational ‘response’, in maintaining the functioning of perceptual 
systems – responding to salient features of the environment, scooping information, 
detecting persistence and change (invariance and fl ux of information) and shaping 
information while seeking for a match between environmental ‘fi ts’ (aff ordances) and 
the observer’s needs and intentions – the functions that are ‘stretched’ or modifi ed in 
cultural processes. Rather than being solely punctual and directed, attention is a fl ow 
or a stream (cf. William James’ concept of ‘margins’ of attention or Gibson’s ‘visual 
world’) and performs the orientational function, i.e. the function of orientation of 
perceptual systems in the environment. Narratives and artefacts, due to their attention-
capturing and monitoring capacity, extend the primary orientational-semiotic 
activity to culture by facilitating sociocultural dynamics, serving as integrational or 
exploratory tools. Gibson’s perspective, in contrast to the neo-Darwinian accounts, 
8 I.e., potentially, a cultural tool – M. G., S. S.
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introduces an important cultural-developmental angle into the biological conception 
of attention: rather than performing solely the function of adaptation of organisms 
to the environments, attention contributes to the eventual mutual adjustment and 
development – not only do living systems adapt to the environments, they re-shape 
their environments in the process of integrating external environmental ‘fi ts’ and ‘props’ 
in their cognitive activity and practices and, thereby, building their ‘cultural niche’.    
3. Narrative and cultural dynamics 
Th e symbolic narrative representation retains a relationship with the primary pre-
symbolic narrativity9 as a form of a basic perceptual and cognitive orientation guided 
by attentional response and information-gathering and aff ected by salient ‘props’ and 
‘fi ts’ in cultural environments. In culture, narrative structures perform the functions 
of shaping, (re)organizing, storing and activating information (pre-conceptual 
knowledge), enabling both its transmission and changeability.    
Change, disturbance, transformation, passage from one state of the system to 
another – otherwise, an attention-capturing event – has been considered the defi nitive 
feature of narrative by many narrative scholars. Change manifested as a delay, 
suspense and uncertainty, a gap between the past and the future or cause and eff ect 
is the focal component of narrative structure that determines the story’s tellability. 
Th e narrative dynamics combines both commonplace and surprise, or, otherwise, 
intuitive expectations (triggering inferences) – and counter-intuitive assumptions 
or images with a high attention-demanding potential (Boyer 1994). Narratives are 
based on a deviation from a predictable course of events and include an element 
of surprise, yet the eff ect of surprise is due exactly to the beliefs and expectations that 
provide the fl uent processing of the story, whereas critical attitude and rationality lag 
behind (see Grishakova 2009). Surprise and deviation from a predictable pattern make 
both the storyteller and the ‘story-taker’ (recipient) revise their tacit assumptions – 
what Sanford and Emmott 2012 refer to as secondary processing or double take, and 
Kahneman 2011 as fast and slow thinking.
In this way, attention-capturing narrative devices (see e.g. Sanford, Emmott 2012; 
Leech, Short 2007, Miall 2006 on various attention controlling strategies), such as 
linguistic and stylistic complexity, schema interruptions and frustrations, reversed 
syntactic or temporal order, gaps, intricate or enigmatic elements (e.g. “cruxes”, Abbott 
2002: 86) intensify the process of ‘information pickup’ and activate cognition processes. 
9 Th e distinction between ‘narrativity’ and ‘narrative’ was explored in Section 2. Th e 
distinction was introduced by Marie-Laure Ryan (2004). For Ryan, however, narrativity is 
a cognitive template activated in the observer’s or user’s mind by computer simulations or 
various life situations. For us, it is the basic form of situational perceptual-cognitive mapping.
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In Meir Sternberg’s terminology, the narrative dynamics triangulates between 
curiosity, suspense and surprise (e.g. Sternberg 1990, 1992, 2001). According to 
Sternberg, suspense arises “from the rival scenarios about the future”, a discrepancy 
between the current information available to the reader and possible happenings. 
Curiosity arises from the inadequate information and desire to know: “[…] while 
knowing that we do not know, we go forward with our mind on the gapped antecedents, 
trying to infer (bridge, compose) them in retrospect” (Sternberg 2001: 117). Th e eff ect 
of surprise occurs when narrative “fi rst unobtrusively gaps or twists its chronology, 
then unexpectedly discloses to us our misunderstanding and enforces a corrective 
reading in late recognition” (Sternberg 2001: 117). In Sternberg, the epistemological 
impulse is subordinated to the dynamics of the double temporality and a discrepancy 
between the represented and communicative time (arguably, knowledge only becomes 
possible in retrospective view, as a belated recognition and explanation). For Danto, 
narrative temporality is, on the contrary, an epistemological category: the dynamics of 
knowing shapes the time fl ow. Within the epistemological perspective, any closure is 
provisional: as Danto puts it, narrative accustoms us to thinking in terms of an open-
ended future (Danto 1985). In cognitive terms, narrative dynamics should be defi ned 
as interplay between not-knowing and knowing, mediated by the desire-to-know.
To assess the epistemological aspect of narrativity, we introduce ignorance as a 
productive, positive impulse triggering narrative dynamics (on the productive ignorance 
see e.g. Smithson 1989). From the epistemological perspective, we defi ne curiosity as 
an epistemological stance, which eggs the reader on projecting herself onto future 
informational cues and chances for knowledge.10 Surprise would depend on both the 
presumption of ignorance and the reader’s self-projection: we cannot be surprised 
by what we know, we can only be surprised by what we ignored. In this connection, 
the value of ignorance may be encoded in both perceptual and cognitive terms – as 
attention/inattention or relevance/irrelevance. Instead of indicating a lack of knowledge 
or distorted knowledge, ignorance may refer to both inattentiveness and irrelevance, as 
derived from the verb ‘ignore’ – i.e. fail to attend (cf. the phenomenon of inattentional 
blindness recently discussed in psychology: inattentional blindness refers to the fact 
that the observer attends to what she is pre-programmed or asked to see and does not 
notice a ‘critical object’ – oft en a quite salient background object). Th e function of critical 
objects in priming is comparable to the role of tacit knowledge in narrative. We cannot 
be surprised by what we know, but we are led to surprise by what we have known or 
expected – by a piece of tacit knowledge whose relevance has not been obvious so far. 
Th is is where the notion of positive or acknowledged ignorance comes in: it defi nes the 
state of undecidability as to relevant or irrelevant information.       
10 We thank Emanuele Bardone for discussing an early draft  of this paper with us and 
introducing us to the concept of chance seeking (see Bardone 2011).   
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In this way, narratives function as exploratory rather than solely explanatory tools. 
Th ey are not meant to tame the chaos of reality by channeling it into ready-made 
causal and temporal forms but, in a forward-looking perspective, to facilitate the 
recognition of meaningful, information-loaded cues and foster meaningful unfolding 
of events. Events do not simply exist as givens in the real world but are ‘diagnosed’ 
by observers. We attribute value to unanticipated events during their unfolding and 
explore possibilities for action through our narrative proclivity (see Ochs, Capps 2001 
on narrative proclivity) that facilitates the recognition of aff ordances, precipitates 
their connections and experience of events as meaningful yet unfi nalized emergences. 
From this point of view, stories function as draft s of experience rather than the 
Dennettian ‘draft s of consciousness’. In storytelling, a negotiation of meaning occurs 
via switching or blending of perspectives, distinct types of causation, temporality 
(with an emphasis of the past, present or future), narrative mediation and modalities. 
Stories as incomplete draft s of experience introduce only hypothetical or suggestive 
connections between the events – suggestive timelines, contingencies rather than 
causalities, tentative evaluations, fuzzy modalities, etc. Th ey display what comes in 
handy and open up further negotiations for meaning (the openness to sense-making 
typical of court narratives which emerge as a result of negotiations between many 
competing narratives; gameplay as narrative with open-ended outcome in videogames; 
stories arising from interaction with or navigation in the environments, etc.).  
Th e rise of new media and computer-mediated communications on the Web threw 
the ability of storytelling to shape digital environments and ‘public sphere’ through 
the ongoing processes of re-mediation, negotiated sense-making, interpretation and 
misinterpretation in a particularly sharp relief. Th ese processes have been assessed in 
research on virtual identity (Ensslin, Muse 2011), relationships between fandom, identity 
and power (Jenkins 1992, 2006; Hills 2002; Gray, Sandvoss, Harrington 2007); digital 
fi ction (Aarseth 1997; Ciccoricco 2007, 2014), and fanfi ction (e.g. Hellekson, Busse 
2006), storytelling in social networks (Page 2012) and various media (Grishakova, Ryan 
2010), narrative activities in digital media wherein the ‘authorship’ becomes contested, 
and challenged (cf. Gray, Johnson 2013). While maintaining a broad, non-essentialist 
view on narrativity as an interpretive-orientational tool and process (see above), we do 
not subscribe to the conception of ‘collective intelligence’ (e.g. Lévy 1997). Instead of 
taking storytelling as a punctual and compartmentalized collectively created event, we 
approach it as “an ongoing process pervading diff erent social spaces” (Brockmeier 2013: 
263); a composition “fashioning the semblance of meaning and order for experience” 
(Gubrium, Holstein 1998: 166). In Gubrium and Holstein’s view, diff erent types of 
narrative environments foster diff erent types of storytelling resulting from the narrative 
work of activation, linkage, composition, performance, collaboration and control. In 
new media environments the narrative work becomes an online process that escapes 
central control and splits into multiple micro-processes.   
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Herewith, narrative’s transformational nature, its core essence of ‘becoming-to-be’ 
is evoked, emerging bottom-up from the subjective and communal interpretations 
and hypothesizing. Storytelling begets transmedial and serialized (Ryan 2013; Kustritz 
2014) quality manifested in overarching narrative threads (commentary chains in 
blogs; threads in forums, or on Twitter) forming particular kinds of ‘attention attractors’ 
and informational cues. Th e online environments explicitly facilitate ‘knowledge co-
elaboration’ (Détienne et al. 2012), or, to borrow Siegfried J. Schmidt’s argument, 
therein an instigative, epistemological ‘Kommunikat-basis’ for the “[constructive] 
process of perception” becomes formed (Schmidt 1994: 502). In other words, new 
media environments become a narrative springboard – a proverbial toolbox to deploy 
and to borrow from, up to and including the build-up of an entirely new ‘box’. Th e core 
idea here can be summarized as ‘stories without borders,’ or the process David Boje 
(2001) describes as ‘antenarrating’. As distinct from conventional narrative structure, 
antenarrative capitalizes on an in-motion ‘bet’. Hence, antenarrating appears as a 
“fl ow of storytelling [in] lived experiences”. It focuses explicitly on the phase prior 
to narrative ‘regulations’ (beginnings, middles, endings, coherences); a progressing, 
ambivalent path whereupon people still “chase [the] story” (Boje 2001: 3–4).
Th e asynchrony (non-simultaneity) in time and distance in physical space 
combined with the sense of immediacy and proximity inherent to “overlapping 
exchanges” (Herring 1999)11 in virtual space facilitate the spread and development of 
stories across new media environments. Th ese are not merely interactive spaces (such 
as hypertext fi ction, multi-user role playing video games), but the spaces constituted by 
participatory communications and shaped by narrative practice (Gubrium, Holstein 
1998; cf. Ryan 2001). However, online communication may also involve the loss of 
storytelling control: “[...] when stories are no longer the work of a single teller [...] 
storytelling is open to misrepresentation and misappropriation” (Page 2012: 164).   
As Ananda Mitra (2010) observes, ‘digital imprints’ such as Facebook status 
updates or blog comments function as ‘narbs’ (narrative bits). Narbs advance into 
larger narrative structures, either as distributed threads and sub-threads or ‘reading 
paths’ in forums and blogs or as personalized content (Mitra 2012; Mitra, Mamani 
2014). To describe such dynamics further, the term ‘beacon’ was coined (in Sorokin 
2013, 201512) to refer to a structuring principle of online communication, an emergent 
construct that ‘pulls onto’ itself all circulating meanings (motifs, attractor-topics) 
11 Herring, Susan C. 1999. Interactional Coherence in CMC. Journal of Computer-mediated 
Communication 4(4) was accessed at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101. 
1999.tb00106.x/full on 11 October 2016.
12 Sorokin, Siim 2015. Collaborative sense-making complexities of (for?) Lost and Breaking 
Bad. Narrative Knowing/Récit et Savoir: Narrative Matters Conference, 2014: Narrative Knowing/
Récit et Savoir can be accessed at https://hal-univ-diderot.archives ouvertes.fr/NARRATIVE_
MATTERS/hal-01086229.
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focusing on a particular unresolved problems or contradiction as they arise in online 
communication, thus creating a co-elaboratively navigatable ‘living’ narrative. Th e 
beacon’s function here is to operate as a mobile structuring and contextualizing 
impulse, throwing its light on interconnected threads of communication.
Recurrent narrative topics and leitmotifs, or ‘narbs’ and ‘beacons’ in online 
com munication – as the emergent supra-discursive constructs on overarching 
communicative interfaces – may expand to new contexts. While replicated and 
transmitted (becoming ‘memes’, stereotype templates or scripts), they run the risk 
of becoming independent of original contexts and ‘parasitic’ (co-evolving or co-
extensive) on other contexts. If to go by Richard Dawkins’ argument (2006[1976]: 
192), these topics – such as the ‘truther conspiracies’ concerning the 9/11 attack, or 
‘Flat Earthers’ – operate as units of cultural transmission (cf., however, Pigden 1995). 
Consequently, topics that gain the most attraction, that is, those that necessitate 
further (narrativizing) investment, obtain a particular kind of digital ‘virality’ (see, 
e.g. Guerini, Strapparava 2014: 444). Cognizant of the danger in turning this term 
into a ‘fetish object’ (Payne 2013), however, its value aff ording adjustment for present 
discussion should not be wholly discarded. Viral topics transmute further in the 
socially distributed collective memory and sense-making (compare: small-town/
village gossip versus ‘alternative’ news stories traversing web pages in designing and/or 
perpetuating peoples’ belief in their ‘truthness’, e.g. manufactured stories on political 
sites, long since debunked, versus the well-known “Game of Telephone”).    
A befi tting example from Estonia originates from December 2015, when a 
particular story went viral within the anti-refugee pages/groups on Facebook (e.g. 
the closed Facebook group EKRE Sõprade Klubi). Th e given story suggested that there 
were refugees arriving on special red-eye fl ights to Tallinn Airport from whence they 
were, thereaft er, ‘secretly’ spirited elsewhere. Th e information supposedly originated 
from an airport offi  cial who did not want to go public out of the fear of losing his/her 
job. In the interested circles the tale quickly gained momentum and a large number of 
people further disseminated it via Facebook’s share feature and/or through a ‘retelling’ 
(copy-pasting the original message/author onto their own Facebook “time line”). 
Ultimately it picked up the interest of a television news magazine (ETV’s Pealtnägija). 
Consequently, a story from a private, closed ‘narrative environment’ developed a 
global, transmedial ‘arc’ within the public mainstream media sphere. However, on 
closer scrutiny, the ‘facts’ were quickly invalidated primarily due to the ‘fi rst-hand 
witness’ turning out to be someone’s friend’s friend who had read about it on Facebook. 
Nonetheless, instead of reconsidering their stance, the ‘truthers’ preserved confi dence 
in their story whilst the undermining eff orts of the ‘propagandist mainstream media’ 
were rejected out of hand.
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Without subscribing to the neo-Darwinian underpinnings of ‘memetics’, we see 
‘memes’ as informational shortcuts (formulas and frames of stereotype thinking) with 
high potential for iteration and recycling. Th e dynamics described above dynamics 
presents a challenge to the Habermasian ‘rational public sphere’ – the ‘emotional 
public sphere’ (Richards 2007) as a space of (mis)communication, a ‘leakage space’ 
perpetuating societal stereotypes, biases and unlimited re-cycling. Debates around 
global warming and controversial issues such as euthanasia, migration problems etc. 
may be spontaneously regulated by salient attractors – surfacing viral topics and stories 
rather than reasoning, argumentation and the regulative negotiation of meanings.
On the positive side, online stories may function as facilitators and regulators of 
social and cultural dynamics and present a challenge to master narratives circulating 
in society. Temporary communities (e.g. fandoms or grassroots movements) emerge 
around stories and fall apart because of the rival stories or when these stories become 
dysfunctional due to the shift ing contexts. Th ese social groups range from fandoms 
(that is, groups of people supporting some fi ctional narratives by retelling, completing 
and developing them) to grassroots movements (that is, minority or social change 
movements, attempting to re-shape master narratives). Th e groups may aim at a more 
involved look on social inequality and marginalization – cf. #BlackLivesMatter and 
#OccupyWallStreet (We are the 99%) movements in the U. S. – or uncovering of some 
hidden truths and global ‘cover-ups’, cf. e.g. with conspiracy theories, people becoming 
‘militants’ for some particular ‘truth’, to adapt Alain Badiou’s notion (Badiou 2007: 
xiii). In other words, such bottom-up developments facilitate emergence of diverse 
social groups through narrative practices. By the collaborative, co-elaborative focus on 
miscellaneous ongoing concerns, the ultimate aim is eff ecting transformative change 
on a societal level, of changing or re-structuring dominant master narratives (what-if 
versus reality). 
In addition to the global ‘storytelling arc’ (private-to-public), similarly a ‘local arc’ 
can occur when the antenarrativistic (Boje 2001) tendencies across operatively similar 
environments (i.e. blog commentary chains, forum/Twitter threads) emerging around 
a narrative artifact (e.g. a TV serial or fi lm) are taken into account. However, where 
the global arc aspires to modify core (material) power relations (competing ‘truths’ – 
‘alternative’ versus ‘sanctioned’), the environments inherent to local arc become 
interlaced through active and creative challenging (and perhaps, overthrowing) of the 
dominant authority (i.e. narrative text and, by extension, its authors) (cf. Hills 2002). 
Hence, even in so-called clear-cut cases, users may remain ‘truthers’ due to ‘offi  cial’ 
solutions remaining unconvincing, ‘gappy’. 
Put diff erently, in cases of global and local arcs, the ‘challenge’ is viewed as 
unanswered (or discredited) by the ‘authorities’. Even so, due to participants building 
on conformability of thought, the key questions on specifi c narrative ambiguities and 
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irregularities (e.g. whodunits, character motivations, narrative logistic errors, etc.) 
become less about debunking the contributions of co-participants and more about 
co-elaboration and ‘pooling’ of assumptions. Th is avails the analyst to observe prolifi c 
developments of ‘userly’ narratives. Commenters’ contributions continuously feed into 
the internal formations of ‘works in progress’ (Hellekson, Busse 2006). Where users 
become ‘textual poachers’ (Jenkins 1992, cf. Certeau 1984[1988]) or, rather perhaps, 
active negotiators of the ‘authority’ of the original narrative, the analyst becomes 
the ‘bridge-builder’ (Mello 2002), someone who is equally a sense-maker, making 
sense of and circumscribing – by utilizing conceptual-analytical thinking tools such 
as ‘topic’, or ‘beacon’ – the ‘worlds’ users and their ‘userly narratives’ construct. Th at 
is, the analyst ‘tracks’ the Bojesque ‘living stories of becoming’ (throughout multiple 
interstices) within the archived online data (blogs, forums, etc.). Such ‘agentic’ stories 
conceivably transcend their own subject/locus dialectics, creating a new kind of tension 
of meaning which may work towards re-calibrating previous hierarchies of power. Or, 
perhaps instead, as Nicholas Rescher puts it, “[w]hat is at work in these self-subsistent 
or subjectless processes are not “agents” but “forces” … [either] diff usely located … 
or lack any real location at all” (Rescher 2001: 5). Perhaps it is the data that has 
become exceedingly more ‘storied’, and narrative the tool for the way of knowing and 
demarcating communal storytelling as such. Hence, across three (or more) separate 
narrative environments, users end up focusing on similar narrative inconsistencies 
(either in character, story, or both) through mutual complementation, development 
and upgrading. Hence incremental, ‘fl uid’, and ‘travelling’ stories develop. 
Conclusions 
Th ough recent studies on storytelling in knowledge management, digital and con-
versational storytelling considerably extended the idea of narrativity beyond text-
centred and discourse-centred narratology, the established frameworks are not always 
adequate to describe the emergence and functioning of narrative due to neglecting 
narrative’s indexical, attention-capturing and knowledge-accretion capacities 
stemming from basic, prelinguistic perceptual-cognitive mapping patterns as the 
core of narrativity. Narrative encompasses an observer’s (be it an individual or a 
group) perspective – an agency at the core of cultural processes. Th e neo-Darwinian 
discourses spreading in the humanities are inadequate to account for complexity and 
diversity of these processes. Due to their attention-capturing and monitoring function, 
narratives serve as both internal and external cognitive ‘props’ in human activities. 
Th ey integrate human cultural practices by extending the primary orientational-
semiotic activity to culture and thereby facilitating sociocultural dynamics.  
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In this connection, studies on the role of narratives as orienting (or disorienting) 
tools in the public space seem to be particularly important. As representations 
stemming from deep-seated semiotic mechanisms of embodied-cognitive orientation, 
narrative data may serve as a crucial source of information about the states of societies 
and individuals, and narrative itself as the source of pre-conceptual, predicative, tacit 
knowledge and a regulative tool. As an on-stage manifestation of off -stage semiotic 
processes, narrative reveals a conceptual exigency, a cognitive defi cit in public 
recognition of vulnerabilities and unmanaged disruptions. Whereas the functioning 
of narrative environments may include a considerable degree of randomness or ‘path-
dependence’, it is also mediated by human agents, performing the roles of ‘gatekeepers’, 
moderators, facilitators, etc., whose eff ort, judgement and rational choice may turn 
path-dependence (the state of being locked in path-dependence and limited by biases 
of the past) into path-creation (see Garud et al. 2010) via open-ended and refl exive 
narrative practices.13 
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Заметки о нарративе, когниции и культурной эволюции  
Опираясь на пост-дарвиновские эволюционные подходы, статья вводит широкое, 
неэссенциалистское определение нарратива для обоснования гипотезы о его 
«повсеместности». Нарративность рассматривается и как характеристика поведения, 
и как формативный принцип символической репрезентации. Нарративная репре-
зен тация сохраняет связь с «первичной» до-символической нарративностью элемен-
тар ного ориентационно-интерпретативного (семиотического) поведения, направ-
ляемого перцептивно заметными объектами и сигналами естественной среды. В статье 
проводится различие между имплицитной нарративностью поведения и не-нарративных 
медиа – и нарративом как эксплицитной символической репрезентацией. Расширяя и 
координируя функции внимания, восприятия и сбора информации, нарратив служит 
когнитивно-исследующим инструментом культурной динамики. С возникновением 
новых медиа и коммуникаций особенно отчетливо выявляется способность нарративов 
формировать процессы смыслообразования и интерпретации в публичной сфере.     
Narratiivist, kognitsioonist ja kultuurievolutsioonist 
Põhjendamaks hüpoteesi narratiivist kui millestki “kõikjalviibivast”, arendab käesolev artikkel 
laiapõhjalist ja mitte-essentsialistlikku vaadet narratiivile, mis tõukub postdarvinlikest 
evolutsioonikäsitlustest. Narratiivsust vaadeldakse nii käitumise tunnusena kui ka sümboolse 
representatsiooni formatiivse printsiibina. Narratiivne representatsioon säilitab seose 
“esmase” eel-sümboolse narratiivsusega (inimeste) põhimises suundmuslik-tõlgenduslikus 
(semiootilises) käitumises, mida mõjutavad tajumuslikult eenduvad objektid ja “vastavused” 
loomulikus keskkonnas. Artiklis eristatakse käitumise ja mitte-narratiivse meedia implitsiitset 
narratiivsust “narratiivist” kui eksplitsiitsest sümboolsest representatsioonist. Tähelepanu 
monitoorivatest ja informatsiooni koguvatest funktsioonidest johtuvalt esineb narratiiv 
kultuuridünaamika kognitiivse-uuriva instrumendina. Iseäranis silmnähtavaks muutub 
narratiivi roll avaliku sfääri vormijana tähendusloome ja tõlgendamise protsessides uues 
meedias.   
